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The Likely Source: An Unexplored
Weakness in the Net Worth Method of
Proof*
IAN M. COMISKY**
The government will often suspect a taxpayer of tax eva-
sion if it discovers that the taxpayer's net worth has increased
and that the taxpayer did not report the full amount of the
increase as taxable income. If the government can establish a
likely source for the increase, a jury will be permitted to infer
that the taxpayer derived the increase from currently taxable
and unreported income. In this article, the author discusses the
origins, development, and varied applications of this "likely
source inference." Then, after critically examining the consti-
tutional underpinnings of the inference, the author argues that
the inference is unconstitutional as presently applied by most
courts. The author concludes by suggesting how the doctrine
can be modified to permit its continued use.
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"Trends in tax prosecution have for at least two decades
been continuously running against the main currents in criminal
procedure. By subtle doctrinal manipulation, the courts confer
more and more discretion on invoking officials and reduce the
roles of judge and jury. The judge's role is limited by his abdica-
tion of responsibility to define the offense and to determine the
sufficiency of evidence. The jury's function is restricted by a
procedural panoply which prevents a full and fair test of the
Government's proofs."'
"[T]he [likely] source requirement is largely a fiction."2
I. INTRODUCTION
The offense of income tax evasion is defined in section 7201 of
the Internal Revenue Code.3 This section provides that "any per-
son who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title" is guilty of a crime against the United
States and is subject to a fine and imprisonment if convicted. To
obtain a conviction under section 7201, the government must es-
tablish that: (1) an additional tax was due and owing; (2) the tax-
payer attempted to evade this tax; and (3) the taxpayer acted
willfully."
The government has used the net worth method of proof for at
least fifty years to establish the elements of the offense of tax eva-
sion.5 Although the government initially employed the net worth
1. Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1966).
2. Hill, The Defense of a Criminal Net Worth Tax Case in the Light of Recent Su-
preme Court Decisions, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 106, 119 (1955).
3. I.R.C. § 7201 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492 (1943); United States v. Schafer, 580 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978).
5. The government also commonly uses two other methods of proof: specific items and
bank deposits. In the specific item method, the government attempts to establish specific
transactions that were not accurately or completely reflected on the tax return. For example,
the receipt of, and the failure to report on a tax return, income from the sale of stock or
securities would constitute a specific item. When the government can demonstrate a number
of specific items, it contends that taxes were evaded for the year in issue. In the bank depos-
its method, the government, through analysis of deposits to all of a taxpayer's bank ac-
counts, attempts to establish that these deposits reflected taxable income. To employ this
method successfully, the government must establish (1) regular and periodic deposits to one
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method to convict racketeers during the 1930's,' by 1950 it had
successfully used the method in prosecutions of "legitimate" busi-
nessmen.7 In the seminal case of Holland v. United States,' the
Supreme Court of the United States noted that "[t]he net worth
method, it seems, has evolved from the final volley to the first shot
in the Government's battle for revenue."' This assessment remains
accurate today.
The net worth method uses circumstantial evidence to estab-
lish that the taxpayer's net worth is greater than the amount sug-
gested by his tax return.10 Pursuant to this method, government
investigators examine the taxpayer's returns, usually for a three-
year period, and identify all of the assets acquired by the taxpayer
and all of the liabilities he incurred in acquiring those assets. The
excess of the assets over the liabilities for each year is the tax-
payer's net worth. This figure is adjusted upward by adding to it
certain nondeductible expenditures, such as amounts for personal
living expenditures, tax payments, and losses on personal assets for
each year." Monies received from nontaxable sources, such as
or more bank accounts; (2) that the taxpayer was engaged in a business or calling that could
have generated these deposits; (3) that the deposits were not generated by nontaxable
sources of income; and (4) that the deposits, after adjustment, were in excess of reported
income. See generally Tax Evasion-Methods of Proof, TAx MGMT. (BNA) No. 330, at A-3
to -11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TAx MGMT.].
6. See United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703
(1936); Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 545 (1932);
Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931). Ralph
"Bottles" Capone was the older brother of Al Capone. Jack Guzik was the number three
man in Al Capone's Chicago organization. Irving Wexler was Arthur Flegenheimer's arch
rival in New York. Mr. Wexler and Mr. Flegenheimer were more popularly known as Waxie
Gordon and Dutch Schultz respectively. See generally E. IREY & W. SLOCUM, THE TAX
DODGERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE T-MEN'S WAR WITH AMERICA'S POLITICAL AND UNDER-
WORLD HOODLUMS (1948).
7. See, e.g., Brodella v. United States, 184 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950).
8. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
9. Id. at 126-27.
10. The term "net worth" actually is a misnomer. Most individuals, upon hearing the
term, think immediately of the financial .statement that is prepared in the course of ob-
taining a bank loan. Bank financial statements, however, reflect the fair market value of the
taxpayer's assets. It is the cost of all the assets, not their fair market value, that is employed
in computing the net worth in a criminal tax case. See TAx MGMT., supra note 5, at A-12;
Hill, supra note 2, at 108; Note, Net Worth and Other Indirect Methods Used in Federal
Income Tax Criminal Fraud Prosecution, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 426 (1955); see also 2 E. Dvrrr
& C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 35.08 (3d ed. 1977).
11. The treatment of losses in the net worth method is not easy to conceptualize. Be-
cause all assets are included in net worth, if an asset is sold at a loss during the years at
issue, and if the loss is nondeductible in nature, the amount of the loss is treated as a
nondeductible expenditure. The difference between the amount of money received and the
cost basis of the asset, as with other nondeductible expenditures, is added back; this in-
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gifts, inheritances, loans, tax free interest, and capital gains, are
then subtracted from the taxpayer's net worth.12 The investigators
compare the resulting adjusted net worth figure with the tax-
payer's reported taxable income for the year. If the adjusted net
worth is greater than the reported income, the government claims
that the difference represents unreported taxable income for the
year or years at issue.18
An example will aid in understanding the method. Assume
that at the beginning of calendar year 1980, a taxpayer has
$100,000 of nonliquid assets and no liabilities. In its investigation,
the government determines that during 1980, the taxpayer spent
$200,000 for a home, $50,000 for a boat, and $10,000 for a car, and
that the taxpayer owned all of these assets on December 31, 1980.
The government further finds that during 1980, the taxpayer spent
$20,000 on clothes, food, and other nondeductible personal expend-
itures. Finally, the government finds that the taxpayer obtained a
$40,000 loan to purchase the boat. Based on these assets, liabilities,
and expenditures, and assuming that the taxpayer still holds the
original $100,000 of nonliquid assets, the government would com-
pute the taxpayer's net worth increase for 1980 as $240,000:
$280,000 in assets acquired and nondeductible expenditures made
during the year, less the new liability of $40,000. If the taxpayer
reported only $90,000 of income on his tax return, the government
would claim that the $150,000 difference between the taxpayer's
net worth increase ($240,000) and reported income ($90,000) repre-
sents unreported taxable income.
The appearance of a net worth "bulge" in a comparison of the
taxpayer's net worth increase and reported taxable income, how-
ever, is not by itself sufficient evidence to establish that the differ-
ence was derived from currently taxable income. The government
also is required either to negate all nontaxable sources of income
for the year or years in question, or to establish a likely source for
the unreported increase in the taxpayer's net worth."' In the exam-
creases the net worth in the year the loss occurred. See TAX MGMT., supra note 5, at A-17.
12. Deductible items not claimed on the tax return have no effect on net worth. Any
deductible item not claimed requires payment of that item by the taxpayer in the year at
issue. Any deductible item not claimed, therefore, is both an expenditure and a deduction in
the net worth computation. Because the item results in both an addition to and a reduction
from net worth, additional deductions have no effect on the net worth computation. Id. at
A-17 to -18.
13. See Duke, supra note 1; Comment, Proving Tax Evasion by the Net Worth
Method, 34 TEx. L. REv. 606 (1956); supra note 10.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958) (per curiam); Holland v.
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ple above, the government cannot convict the taxpayer for failing
to report the $150,000 net worth "bulge" unless it either negates
all possible nontaxable sources of the income or establishes that
some legal or illegal enterprise engaged in by the taxpayer was the
likely source. If the government establishes a likely source for the
net worth increase, the jury then is permitted to infer that the tax-
payer derived the increase from unreported and currently taxable
income.15 Because it is easier to prove the affirmative than the neg-
ative, the government usually elects to establish a likely source for
the claimed net worth increase in criminal tax prosecutions.16
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regula-
tions refers to the likely source inference. Although the Supreme
Court of the United States sanctioned the likely source inference
in Holland v. United States,1 7 commentators have criticized the
inference," and two federal courts of appeals recently reversed
convictions because the government failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to establish the existence of a likely source."
Despite the criticism, no commentator or court has reexam-
ined the constitutional underpinnings of the likely source inference
in the past twenty-five years. This article traces the development
of the likely source inference, and the proof deemed sufficient to
establish it, from the pre-Holland period to the present. The arti-
cle also suggests certain modifications essential to permit the con-
tinued use of the inference in tax evasion prosecutions in which
the government relies on the net worth method of proof.
II. HISTORY OF THE LIKELY SOURCE INFERENCE
A. The Early Years
Even before Holland, federal courts of appeals had reviewed a
number Of tax evasion convictions in which the government intro-
duced likely source proof. In Gleckman v. United States, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
tax evasion conviction for the years 1929 and 1930 based on "cir-
cumstantial evidence that [the taxpayer had] a business outside of
that described in his return and that at least some of his deposits
United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1955).
15. See 2 E. DEvIrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 10, § 35.08 and cases cited therein.
16. TAx MGMT., supra note 5, at A-25 to -27.
17. 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954).
18. See Duke, supra note 1; Hill, supra note 2, at 119.
19. United States v. Grasso, 629 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Bethea, 537
F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1976).
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were derived from it."'20 At trial the government established that in
1928, a pre-prosecution year, the defendant had learned that in-
come derived from illegal liquor transactions was taxable, and had
therefore filed income tax returns for the years 1925 through 1927.
The government also showed that in 1929 the defendant had listed
his occupation on property statements as "merchant," which, ac-
cording to the court, was a term "broad enough to include one en-
gaged in illegal liquor transactions,' 1 and that in both 1929 and
1930, the defendant had received income in excess of the amount
reported on his return." Although the government did not present
direct evidence that the taxpayer had actually engaged in illegal
liquor transactions in either 1929 or 1930, the jury convicted the
defendant on the basis of the circumstantial evidence. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the circumstantial evidence was suf-
ficient to create the inference that the likely source was the illegal
buying and selling of liquor.'s
Fourteen years later, in Schuermann v. United States,"4 the
Eighth Circuit had an opportunity to examine likely source proof
more critically. In Schuermann a jury convicted the defendant of
tax evasion for the years 1942 to 1945. The government established
that the defendant had operated a numbers business during the
war years. During those years, the taxpayer's expenditures and in-
vestments exceeded his reported income. The government did not
prove, however, that a likely source existed for the net worth in-
crease. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On
the government's alleged failure to prove a likely source, the court
merely stated:
One can believe that his [the defendant's] business, like many
other enterprises, legal and illegal, was a beneficiary of the pros-
perity of the war years, and that his expenditures kept pace with
his income. If the skill of the tax evader in concealing income is
not to become an "invincible barrier to proof".. . the federal
20. 80 F.2d 394, 399 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1936).
21. Id. The court even indicated that the government's burden of investigation is less in
a case involving illegal taxpayer activity than in one involving legal taxpayer activity: "[Ilt
would not be possible for any complete account of (the taxpayer's] business to be made up
for the government by any kind of skilled accountancy. More especially, where the business
transacted may be of an illegal nature." Id. at 401.
22. Id. at 397-400. In Gleckman the government used the bank deposits method to
establish the tax deficiency. The government nonetheless attempted to establish that the
bank deposits were derived from taxable income. See generally Duke, supra note 1, at 13-
15; Note, supra note 10, at 433-36.
23. 80 F.2d at 399-402.
24. 174 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949).
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appellate courts will have to rely heavily upon the sound judg-
ment of the trial courts in appraising the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to warrant submission of a tax evasion case to a jury, and
upon the fairness and common sense of juries in determining
guilt or innocence when such cases are submitted to them.
2'
Although the Eighth Circuit in Gleckman and Schuermann
sanctioned the use of minimal evidence to establish a likely source
for allegedly illicit, unreported income, in similar cases the govern-
ment presented a substantial amount of likely source evidence. In
United States v. Chapman,'6 for example, the government's likely
source evidence included the testimony of seven meat peddlers,
each of whom stated that during one of the war years, they had
paid either the taxpayer, the president of a meat-packing com-
pany, or his salesmen overceiling prices, in cash, for meat. The tax-
payer's salesmen, in turn, testified that they forwarded the cash
payments to the taxpayer. In addition, the government established
that the taxpayer did not report income from any cash sales in the
year in question. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit properly affirmed the conviction, holding that the spe-
cific items of unreported income, the overceiling cash payments,
established a likely source for the claimed net worth increase.'
7
At least one circuit court reversed a net worth conviction dur-
ing this time period because the government failed to establish a
likely source for the unreported income. In Ford v. United
States,'e the former chief of the Galveston, Texas police force was
convicted of tax evasion for the years 1945 to 1947. At trial the
government attempted to demonstrate that bribes and payoffs
were the likely source of the claimed net worth increase. The de-
fendant admitted that gambling and prostitution existed in Gal-
veston, but denied that he had ever accepted a bribe. A govern-
ment witness, the operator of a Galveston house of prostitution,
testified that in 1943, a pre-prosecution year, "she left $100 in cash
25. Id. at 399 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 518 (1943)). The evi-
dence also did not establish that the net worth computation included all of the defendant's
assets. The court relied on the defendant's tax returns to negate the possibilty that the
source of the increase was prior asset accumulation. Id.
26. 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948).
27. Id. at 1003; see also United States v. Skidmore, 123 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 800 (1942). In Skidmore, government witnesses testified that they paid the
defendant "protection" money which was not reported by the taxpayer. Proof of specific
items of unreported income again sufficiently established a likely source for the claimed net
worth increase. Id. at 608, 610.
28. 210 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1954).
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'at the defendant's office,' that starting the latter part of 1945 and
continuing through May of 1947 she made regular payoffs 'to the
police department' of $100 per month." 9
Even though the government's witness could not directly con-
nect the defendant to any of these payments, the trial court admit-
ted the witness's testimony into evidence and the jury convicted
the taxpayer. On appeal the Fifth Circuit suggested that the gen-
eral testimony which established "opportunities" for the defendant
to accept payoffs was admissible and would have been sufficient to
sustain the conviction. The court held, however, that because the
government failed to present any evidence that connected the de-
fendant to the payments from the government's witness, the wit-
ness's testimony was prejudicial and a new trial was required."
Towards the end of the pre-Holland era, the United States
courts of appeals reviewed several convictions of taxpayers in
which the government had alleged that a legitimate business enter-
prise was the likely source of the claimed net worth increase. In
Jelaza v. United States"' and Brodella v. United States,3 2 the tax-
payers each owned legal businesses: Jelaza owned a small retail es-
tablishment, and Brodella owned several retail liquor stores. The
government established in each case that the reported gross profit
from the respective businesses was significantly less than that of
similar businesses in the community.' Moreover, in Brodella the
business's books did not reflect purchases of approximately $15,000
worth of goods, and the taxpayer's books and personal return did
not show any profits from the sale of these goods. 4 Both circuit
courts affirmed the taxpayers' convictions. In Brodella, the Sixth
Circuit found that the comparative statistics and specific items of
unreported income established the liquor stores as the likely
source of the claimed net worth increase.3 In Jelaza, the Fourth
Circuit noted that "[a] stronger case against the taxpayer would
undoubtedly have been made had the Government proved the pre-
cise source of income . . . ,-8 but it nonetheless found the evi-
29. Id. at 317.
30. Id. at 318. "[A] conclusion [that the taxpayer received the payoffs] cannot be per-
mitted to be based upon mere conjecture or suspicion." Id. at 317.
31. 179 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1950).
32. 184 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950).
33. Id. at 826; 179 F.2d at 204.
34. 184 F.2d at 826.
35. Id.
36. 179 F.2d at 204.
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dence sufficient to sustain the conviction. 7
By the spring of 1954, it was apparent that the amount of
likely source proof deemed sufficient to sustain convictions in
criminal tax prosecutions varied widely among the circuits. 8 The
circuits also differentiated cases in which the claimed net worth
increase allegedly stemmed from illegal activities of the taxpayer,
from cases in which the increase stemmed from legal activities.' 9
At that time, the courts still had not received any guidance from
the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the Court had
permitted the government to use circumstantial evidence to obtain
a tax evasion conviction in United States v. Johnson, it did not
analyze the net worth method or its variations.
To resolve these differences and give direction to the circuit
courts, the Supreme Court on June 7, 1954 granted certiorari in
five net worth tax evasion cases, and vacated its prior denial of
certiorari in three other such cases.4 One of these cases, Holland v.
United States,4 2 became the Court's lead opinion and the control-
ling precedent in this area of the law.
B. Holland v. United States
Justice Clark, a former Attorney General of the United States,
wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in Holland. The court
first noted that the number of petitions seeking Supreme Court
37. Id. at 204-05.
38. For a summary of other pre-Holland likely source net worth tax evasion cases, see
Hill, supra note 2, and Note, supra note 10.
39. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
40. 319 U.S. 503 (1943). In Johnson the government used taxpayer expenditures to cor-
roborate the fact that the taxpayer owned the gambling establishments in issue and should
have reported income from these businesses.
41. Sullivan v. United States, 212 F.2d 125 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1010,
aff'd, 348 U.S. 170 (1954); Smith v. United States, 210 F.2d 496 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 347
U.S. 1010, afl'd, 348 U.S. 142 (1954); Holland v. United States, 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.),
cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1008, afl'd, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Friedberg v. United States, 207 F.2d
777 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1006, affd, 348 U.S. 142 (1954); Calderon v.
United States, 207 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1008, rev'd, 348 U.S. 160
(1954); McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 927,
denial of cert. vacated, 347 U.S. 1007 (1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 905 (1955), vacating
206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1954), affd, 221 F.2d 807 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955);
Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 857 (1953), denial of
cert. vacated, 347 U.S. 1007 (1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 905 (1955), vacating 204 F.2d
666 (8th Cir. 1953), affd, 223 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 986 (1955); Gold-
baum v. United States, 204 F.2d 74 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 831 (1953), denial of
cert. vacated, 347 U.S. 1007 (1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 905 (1955), vacating 204 F.2d 74
(9th Cir. 1953), affd, 222 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 801 (1955).
42. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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review of net worth cases had multiplied in recent years, and that
the Court had finally concluded that "the [net worth] method in-
volved something more than the ordinary use of circumstantial evi-
dence in the usual criminal case. Its bearing, therefore, on the safe-
guards traditionally provided in the administration of criminal
justice called for a consideration of the entire theory.""'
The Court then proceeded to catalogue various weaknesses of
the net worth method, including: (1) the assumption that the in-
crease in net worth was derived from taxable income rather than
from nontaxable sources, such as accumulated cash, gifts, or loans;
(2) the possible inability of the taxpayer to recount accurately his
financial history; (3) the government's ability to selectively intro-
duce some, but not all, of the statements made by a taxpayer to
government agents; and (4) the difficulty in allocating a net worth
increase to any specific taxable year." The Court stated that:
While we cannot say that these pitfalls inherent in the net
worth method foreclose its use, they do require the exercise of
great care and restraint.... Trial courts should approach these
cases in the full realization that the taxpayer may be ensnared
in a system which, though difficult for the prosecution to utilize,
is equally hard for the defendant to refute."
To protect the taxpayer from the dangers inherent in the
method, the Court held that no net worth conviction can be sus-
tained unless the government establishes a definite beginning net
worth, traces leads provided by the taxpayer as to nontaxable
sources of income, and proves a likely source for the claimed net
worth increase." By defining the elements of the method, the
Court created evidentiary safeguards that increased the govern-
ment's burden of proof in net worth cases from what courts had
demanded previously.
Of the three safeguards created, the Court found that likely
source proof was the most critical to the government's case. The
Court noted that
requisite to the use of the net worth method is evidence sup-
porting the inference that the defendant's net worth increases
are attributable to currently taxable income.
43. Id. at 124-25.
44. Id. at 127-29.
45. Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 137-39.
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...Increases in net worth, standing alone, cannot be as-
sumed to be attributable to currently taxable income. But proof
of a likely source, from which the jury could reasonably find
that the net worth increases sprang, is sufficient.'
7
Once the government establishes a likely source, the Court added,
it does not have to negate nontaxable sources, because the likely
source proof carries with it the requisite source negations.' 8
The Court also noted that because "circumstantial evidence as
to guilt is the chief weapon of a method that is itself only an ap-
proximation," jury instructions in a net worth case should be espe-
cially clear and should include "a summary of the nature of the net
worth method, the assumptions on which it rests, and the infer-
ences available both for and against the accused."' 9
With these evidentiary safeguards clearly outlined, the Court
reviewed the evidence presented at trial. The government main-
tained that profits from the operation of a legitimate hotel busi-
ness- constituted the likely source for the claimed net worth in-
crease. The evidence established that business at the hotel
increased during the year in issue, 1948, but reported profits fell to
approximately one quarter of those disclosed by previous manage-
ment in an earlier year.
The Court found that the government had demonstrated that
the hotel was capable of producing much more income than the
taxpayer had reported. The Court noted that the entire net worth
increase could have come from unreported hotel income and "still
the hotel's total earnings for the year would have been only 73% of
the sum reported by the previous owner for the comparable period
in 1945."50 Affirming the conviction, the Court held that because
the operation of the hotel could have accounted for the entire net
worth increase, the jury was permitted to infer that the increase
was derived from currently taxable income. 1
The Holland Court suggested that likely source proof is
mandatory in every case and that the government can meet its
burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to account for all
of the claimed net worth increase. Although the Court subse-
quently clarified a portion of the Holland opinion in United States
47. Id. at 137-38 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 129.
50. Id. at 137.
51. Id. at 137-38.
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v. Massei, 2 which held that the government could either prove a
likely source or negate nontaxable sources, the Court has never
held that proof which fails to account for all or at least a substan-
tial portion of a claimed net worth increase is sufficient to convict
a taxpayer. Nonetheless, in the years that followed, the circuit
courts quickly diluted Holland's likely source evidentiary
safeguard.
C. Post-Holland: 1955
In March 1955, in United States v. Adonis," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion of a salaried employee of the State of New Jersey. The court
discussed the recent Holland decision, and, without supporting ci-
tations, stated that "under the doctrine of the Holland case, 'proof
of a likely source', without evidence of how much that source
yielded, is sufficient additional evidence to justify the inference the
government seeks to create."" With one phrase, the court diluted
the Holland safeguard, created only a few months earlier. Instead
of a requirement that the likely source account for all or at least a
quantifiable portion of the claimed net worth increase, after Ado-
nis, the identification of any likely source, regardless of the specific
amount that the source generated, would be sufficient evidence to
support a conviction.
Even under this diluted standard, however, the government's
evidence in Adonis was insufficient to establish a likely source.
Struggling to find a ground upon which to affirm the conviction,
the Third Circuit turned to the government's allegation that the
taxpayer had intentionally given government agents false state-
ments to explain the claimed net worth increase. The court held
that the government had sufficiently proven willful misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the taxpayer, and that the jury could therefore
infer that the claimed increase was derived from a taxable source.5
Because the government can almost always identify some source
for a claimed net worth increase, or establish that some statement
made by the taxpayer is not totally accurate, Adonis sounded an
early death knell to the carefully constructed Holland safeguard."
52. 355 U.S. 595 (1958) (per curiam).
53. 221 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1955).
54. Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 719.21.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 38
(1957); infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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Other circuit courts in 1955 also failed to preserve the Holland
likely source safeguard. In United States v. Costello," the likely
source was gambling. The government's evidence established that
the defendant had interests in slot machines and jukeboxes, and
that he had received $30,000 for keeping bookmakers away from a
racetrack for two years.' 8 In April 1955, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that because
"[g]ambling is an occupation with indeterminate possibilities that
might well have brought in more than $100,000 in a single
year-the highest [income] with which [the defendant] was
charged in the four 'indictment years, "'" the evidence presented
was sufficient to permit the jury to infer that gambling was the
likely source of the claimed net worth increase. 60
In June 1955, in Scanlon v. United States," the First Circuit
similarly found that testimony "that the defendant was a bookie in
order to make a large profit and not 'for just a weeks pay"' was
sufficient to permit the jury to infer that this occupation was the
likely source of the claimed increase in the defendant's net worth."
Thus, within six months of the Holland decision, the First,
Second, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals had failed to require
the government to present proof of a likely source sufficient to ac-
count for a quantifiable portion of the claimed increase in net
worth." In subsequent years, courts generally have been no more
demanding of the government's likely source proof. For ease of
analysis, the following sampling of more recent cases has been cat-
57. 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
58. Id. at 671.
59. Id. at 672.
60. Id. at 671-72.
61. 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955).
62. Id. at 390.
63. Not all courts immediately diluted the Holland requirement. In Vloutis v. United
States, 219 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1955), the defendant had been convicted of tax evasion for the
years 1944 and 1945. The government, as in Holland, attempted to establish that the likely
source for the increase in net worth was the taxpayer's operation of legitimate businesses, in
this case the Old Gem and Kit Kat restaurants. The government established that although
the gross receipts of the Kit Kat exceeded those of the Old Gem, the Kit Kat reported less
profit than the Old Gem. The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction on a number of grounds.
The court noted, inter alia, that the Kit Kat was a restaurant whereas the Old Gem was
primarily a "saloon." The court also noted that the government failed to introduce any evi-
dence that the businesses had similar inventories, costs, or operating expenses. The court
held that it was improper to infer that the increase in net worth came from unreported Kit
Kat profits, based upon the fact that one restaurant reported less income than the other. As
the court stated: "[t]o allow evidence which can support only a meaningless conclusion, such
as the comparison allowed here, clearly prejudices the rights of the defendant." Id. at 790.
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egorized according to whether the alleged likely source was an ille-
gal or legal activity of the taxpayer.
D. Post-Holland: The Traditional View
Circuit courts of appeal have continued to affirm net worth
convictions in likely source cases involving illegal activities of the
taxpayer, even when the government presents only minimal evi-
dence. For example, in United States v. Ford,64 a New York police
officer was convicted of tax evasion for the years 1947 through
1951."" The government attempted both to negate nontaxable
sources and to show as a likely source the receipt of bribes. The
evidence established that the officer was a member of the vice
squad during a portion of the years in issue; that he had "opportu-
nities" to accept bribes; that gambling was prevalent in the area;
that the officer had been informed of sales of policy slips but took
no action until other police officers were notified of similar sales;
that the prosecution of gambling cases increased after he left the
vice squad; and that he was on "friendly terms" with a professional
gambler."
While holding that the government had successfully negated
all nontaxable sources, the Second Circuit also held that the evi-
dence of the officer's "opportunities" to accept bribes was suffi-
cient to sustain his conviction, even without testimony that the of-
ficer had actually received a bribe. The court stated that evidence
of "opportunities" was "relevant and material for its tendency to
show that the unreported receipts, independently established, de-
rived from a taxable source. . . .[The evidence] added strength to
the inference that the unreported receipts were taxable.
'67
In United States v. Frank," the government employed both
the bank deposits and net worth methods of proof." The likely
source proof consisted of findings that the taxpayer had reported
gain from "sporting enterprises" on his tax returns for pre-prose-
cution years but did not report a similar gain in 1948, the year in
issue. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that the
64. 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 38 (1957).
65. See Ford v. United States, 210 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1954); supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
66. 237 F.2d at 60.
67. Id. at 65 (emphasis in original).
68. 245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1957).
69. Id. at 286-87, For a discussion of the bank deposits method of proof, see supra note
[Vol. 36:1
LIKELY SOURCE INFERENCE
term "sporting enterprises" was a "euphemistic term for gambling
profits," and that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to
infer that gambling was the likely source for the claimed increase
in the taxpayer's net worth.70
In Armstrong v. United States,7 1 the taxpayer was a bus
driver for the Los Angeles Transit Authority. The government al-
leged that the sale of "pep" pills was the likely source of an in-
crease of approximately $51,000 in the taxpayer's net worth. The
evidence established that on one occasion an officer had seized 650
tablets of benzedrine or amphetamine from the defendant's wife;
that on a second occasion another officer purchased thirty dollars
worth of pills from the defendant's wife; that on two other occa-
sions bottles of pills were seized in searches of the defendant's
home; and that these drugs could not be sold legally in Califor-
nia.72 The Ninth Circuit held that the probative value of the testi-
mony outweighed its prejudicial effect and was sufficient to permit
the jury to infer that the sale of pills was the likely source for the
claimed net worth increase.7
In Ford, Frank, and Armstrong, each court allowed the gov-
ernment to present likely source evidence without requiring the
government to prove that the likely source was sufficient to ac-
count for a quantifiable portion of the claimed net worth increase.
Moreover, each court permitted the government to introduce very
damaging evidence of other crimes to establish the illegal source. 4
It is difficult to believe that any jury would have acquitted the tax-
payers once the government presented unexplained or unrefuted
evidence of graft, gambling, or possession of illicit drugs.
70. Id. at 287. There was also testimony that the taxpayer had a "possibility" of income
from a pinball business. The trial judge thought such evidence was weak and the Third
Circuit agreed. Id.
71. 327 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1964).
72. Id. at 192.
73. Id. at 194. The court also followed the "indeterminate possibilities" case, United
States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955), af['d, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). See also supra
notes 57-60 and accompanying text. In United States v. Mackey, 345 F.2d 499 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 667 (1965), the Seventh Circuit, following Costello, held that the tax-
payer's admission that he ran a policy wheel operation presented sufficient "indeterminate
possibilities" for income that the likely source was sufficiently established. 345 F.2d at 507.
74. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulates the admissibility of evidence
of other crimes in criminal cases. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Several courts have begun to analyze
carefully the types of evidence of the defendant's other crimes admissible in a subsequent
criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). These cases may
signal an increased scrutiny of such evidence in criminal trials. See also infra text accompa-
nying note 212.
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The use of minimal likely source evidence in cases involving
illegal taxpayer activity continues. In 1980, in United States v.
Hamilton,5 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction of the slot
machine manager of a hotel and casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. The
government asserted that the likely source of a $64,664 increase in
the taxpayer's net worth was a slot machine "skim. '76 The evi-
dence established that the taxpayer had an "unusual system of
dealing with slot machine revenues," and did not permit other em-
ployees to count or wrap the coins; that the hotel had filed an in-
surance claim to recover losses caused by "employee dishonesty";
and that, according to a statistical expert, the odds that the hotel's
slot machines would perform as poorly as reported were greater
than two billion to one.77
The government did not present evidence that the taxpayer
had participated in or received any money from the "skimming" of
casino receipts, or that such receipts could have accounted for the
claimed net worth increase. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found
the evidence sufficient to permit the jury to infer that the casino
receipts were the source of the increase in net worth.78
Circuit courts also have affirmed "legitimate business" net
worth convictions when the government presented significantly less
likely source evidence than it did in Holland. For example, in
Whitfield v. United States,9 the government attempted to show
that the likely source of the claimed net worth increase was the
operation of a motel. The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction on
evidence which established only that the taxpayer and her de-
ceased husband operated a fourteen-unit motel, that eight units
were added to the motel in 1951 or 1952, and that a swimming pool
and cocktail lounge were added in 1958 and 1959.80
In United States v. Horn Ming Dong,81 the government at-
tempted to prove that the taxpayer's grocery store was the likely
source of the net worth increase. The government established that
the store was open seven days a week for long hours, that the tax-
payer did not maintain inventory records for cash purchases, and
that the grocery spent no money for advertising.82 Even though de-
75. 620 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 713.
77. Id. at 715.
78. Id.
79. 383 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1967).
80. Id. at 144.
81. 436 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1971).
82. United States v. Horn Ming Dong, 293 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (D. Ariz. 1968), aff'd,
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fense witnesses testified that the store could not have generated
the $140,000 of allegedly unreported income, the district court
noted that "a high mark-up is inherent to neighborhood grocery
stores ..., particularly those selling liquors," and held that the
proof was sufficient to establish the grocery as the likely source.88
On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed the conviction of the tax-
payer for the years 1959 through 1964."
Taxpayers in more recent "legal" likely source cases have
fared no better. For example, in United States v. Costanzo,"
the government attempted to negate nontaxable sources and to es-
tablish that the likely source was the defendant's bakery business,
Costanzo's Bread, Inc. The evidence established that the bakery
reported nearly $500,000 in gross sales per year.86 The Second Cir-
cuit found that the government had negated nontaxable sources,
and that the bakery "was a successful business with many sizable
accounts, and was large enough to generate substantial amounts of
unreported cash receipts. ' ' 87 Without any proof of the profits of
similar bakeries or any proof that the bakery was not accurately
reporting sales, the Second Circuit found this evidence sufficient to
establish the bakery as the likely source and affirmed the
conviction. a8
In Whitfield, Horn Ming Dong, and Costanzo, the courts, in
"legal" likely source cases, failed to require the government to pre-
sent likely source evidence sufficient to account for a quantifiable
portion of the claimed net worth increase. Indeed, it appears that
as the Adonis decision" forewarned, the mere identification of a
likely source is now sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
tax evasion.
Likely source proof, of course, has not been deficient in all
cases. For example, in United States v. Nunan,90 an attorney was
convicted of tax evasion for the years 1946 through 1950. The gov-
ernment established that the defendant had failed to report in-
436 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1971).
83. Id.
84. 436 F.2d at 1242-43.
85. 581 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979).
86. Id. at 33.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 33 nn.4 & 5; see also United States v. Abatino, No. 81-1454X (9th Cir. Apr.
22, 1982).
89. 221 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1955); see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
90. 236 F.2d 576, 583-85 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 912 (1957); see also
United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1976) (failure of an attorney to report
settlement fees).
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come not only from certain transactions related to his law practice,
but also from interest payments, capital gains, and dividends re-
ceived. In United States v. Sclafani,9' the government established
that $50,000 of corporate loans payable to the defendant's business
were repaid to the defendant personally, that the defendant re-
ceived $149,000 from the corporation in cash and by check, and
that the defendant used $35,000 of corporate funds to purchase se-
curities.92 In both of these cases, the government's likely source
proof included specific items of unreported income that accounted
for a substantial portion of the increase in the taxpayer's net
worth.9 8
Taxpayer admissions also may establish a likely source. For
example, in United States v. Tunnell, 4 a motel owner was con-
victed of tax evasion for the years 1965 through 1967. During the
investigation, the taxpayer informed a government agent that he
had employed between two and four girls at the motel during the
years in issue, and that he made as much as $12,000 per year from
their prostitution activities. 8 This admission, which permitted the
government to account for a substantial portion of the claimed net
worth increase, was sufficient proof to sustain the conviction."
Finally, strong circumstantial evidence may be used to estab-
lish a likely source. In United States v. Rifkin,97 the taxpayer was
convicted on charges of corporate and personal tax evasion. The
likely source was the taxpayer's pharmacy. Employees of the phar-
macy testified that they had received cash from the defendant
while he was standing behind the counter in the pharmacy, and
that they were instructed to exchange this cash for teller's or cash-
ier's checks payable to designated stockbrokers. The government
also established that the checks were, in fact, used to purchase
$65,000 worth of stock during the years in issue, and that these
monies accounted for approximately sixteen percent of the phar-
macy's gross receipts. The Second Circuit properly found that this
evidence established a likely source for the claimed net worth
91. 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
92. Id. at 413.
93. Sclafani, 265 F.2d at 413; Nunan, 236 F.2d at 586.
94. 481 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974).
95. Id. at 151.
96. Id. Apparently, no issue concerning the need to corroborate the admission was
raised at trial. See United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954), a companion case to
Holland.




Even though proof in some of the cases outlined above was
sufficient to establish the likely source, and although some lower
courts during the 1950's reversed convictions for insufficient likely
source proof,"9 the vast majority of the federal district and circuit
courts have failed to analyze critically likely source proof and to
follow the evidentiary safeguard erected by the Supreme Court in
Holland. As one commentator noted: "The [likely source] require-
ment has become in many courts a duty merely to show that the
defendant is engaged in a profit-directed activity of some kind."']
E. Return to the Holland Standard
As noted earlier, 10 1 two different circuit courts recently re-
versed convictions because of the government's failure to establish
a likely source for the claimed increase in the taxpayer's net worth.
In United States v. Bethea,02 the defendant contended that the
net worth increase established by the government came from an
inheritance from his deceased brother. The government did not of-
fer evidence to refute this claim, but instead "relie[d] solely upon a
natural disinclination to believe that large sums of money are ever
cached away."' 03 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that because the government could not negate
nontaxable sources of income, it had to establish a likely source for
the claimed increase.1
0 4
The likely source evidence presented by the government es-
tablished that the defendant was a carpenter. The government also
suggested during cross-examination of the defendant that he had
received illicit income from narcotics sales. 05 Although the lower
court found that the government sufficiently established the defen-
dant's carpentry trade as the likely source, the Fourth Circuit dis-
98. Id. at 1152-53.
99. See e.g., United States v. Kleinman, 167 F.2d 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (government
failed to establish graft as the likely source when defendant was employed as an Internal
Revenue agent); United States v. Uccellini, 159 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Pa. 1957) (government's
proof negated assertion that net worth increase was derived from the defendant's business);
United States v. Donovan, 142 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Va. 1956) (government's proof negated
assertion that defendant's business was the source for increase in net worth); United States
v. O'Malley, 131 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (failure to establish any likely source).
100. Duke, supra note 1, at 28.
101. See supra text accompanying note 19.
102. 537 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 1190.
104. Id. at 1190-91.
105. Id. at 1191.
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agreed. 106 The court noted that except for one self-serving state-
ment of the defendant," 7 there was no evidence to establish that
the carpentry income accounted for the claimed increase in net
worth: "Most importantly, there is nothing in the record to indi-
cate that Bethea's carpentry income went up at all during the
years 1971 and 1972 when his net worth sharply increased."'1 8
In addition, the court was highly critical of the government's
attempts to interject narcotics as the likely source during the
cross-examination of the defendant: "There are two problems with
this suggested source of income. First, not one shred of evidence
was introduced at trial to show that Bethea had any dealings in
narcotics . . . . Second, the timing of any narcotics activity was
not shown or even suggested."' 0 Because the government did not
present evidence of "substantial earned income," the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the conviction.110
In United States v. Grasso,"' a case with a long and storied
history,"' the defendant was found guilty in a nonjury trial of one
count of income tax evasion. The Second Circuit, in a per curiam
opinion, noted that the defendant had reported income on his tax
return from a restaurant, a band, a bonding business, and invest-
ments, but that the government had not made any effort to deter-
mine if the taxpayer understated income from any of these sources.
The court stated:
The suggestion that his reported sources of income were the
likely sources of his more than $60,000 in unreported income
without verification is inconsistent with the requirements of
Massei and Holland that the government in a net worth case
must verify the available facts and leads either to show a likely
source or negate alternative sources. 1"
Because the government failed either to negate nontaxable sources
or to show a likely source sufficient to account for the claimed in-
crease in net worth, the court reversed the conviction. The court
concluded that "a conviction based on sources suggested but not
106. Id.
107. Id. The defendant had apparently inflated his income on a credit application.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1191-92.
111. 629 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. See United States v. Grasso, 413 F. Supp. 166 (D. Conn. 1976) (after mistrial de-
clared, charges dismissed on grounds of double jeopardy), affd, 552 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 901 (1978).
113. 629 F.2d at 808.
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verified by the government (although apparently verifiable) and
which are not even plausible much less proved hardly establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."114
In Bethea and Grasso, the Fourth and Second Circuits held
that likely source proof that fails to account for the increase in net
worth is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Although these cases
may signal increased judicial scrutiny and a return to the Holland
standard of likely source proof, neither case reexamined Holland
or the constitutional underpinnings of its evidentiary safeguards.
No court in the past twenty-five years has undertaken such an
analysis. Since the Supreme Court in the past quarter century has
carefully reviewed the standards governing the use of presump-
tions and inferences in other criminal settings, a reexamination of
the likely source inference is appropriate.
III. PERMISSIVE INFERENCES
A. A Brief History
An inference is a statement that permits a factfinder to infer
one fact from the proof of another. As a species of the more gener-
alized presumption, it is an evidentiary device that links two facts
or sets of facts defined as the predicate fact and the presumed
fact.11 A mandatory inference or presumption requires a jury to
infer the existence of the second fact from proof of the first.116 A
permissive inference, as the term suggests, allows but does not re-
quire a jury to infer the existence of a second fact from proof of
the first.
117
Inferences and presumptions are widely used in the criminal
114. Id.
115. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissible Inferences: The Value of Complexity,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 306 (1954); J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW (1895); 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (3d ed. 1940) for their discussions and different definitions of
inferences and presumptions.
116. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Nesson, supra note 115, at 1201
nn.34 & 36.
117. The commentators have extensively discussed inferences and presumptions in the
criminal law. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in
Criminal Law: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Christie & Pye, Presump-
Jions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law, 1970 DuKE L.J. 917 (1970); Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Crimi-
nal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977); Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Crim-
inal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341 (1970). For purposes of this discussion, the terms
inference and presumption will be used interchangably.
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justice system. Although most inferences evolve from either federal
or state legislative enactments, some are judicially created.11 Pro-
fessor McCormick has noted that this type of evidentiary device is
sanctioned for a number of reasons. These reasons include the rec-
ognition that there is often a high probability that the presumed
fact follows from the predicate fact, procedural convenience, fair-
ness in allocating the burden of initial production to those with
superior access to the proof, and social and economic policy rea-
sons.11 9 Since procedural convenience and fairness in allocating ev-
identiary burdens have limited applicability when the government
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of
the United States has carefully reviewed statutorily and judicially
created inferences.
The Supreme Court has applied three different, yet interre-
lated, lines of constitutional analysis in its review of inferences.
Traditionally, inferences have been scrutinized under a "rational
relation" due process test and under the fifth amendment self-in-
crimination clause.120 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
begun to view inferences as part of a larger group of burden-shift-
ing devices, subject to scrutiny under In re Winship" and its
progeny. Since the Supreme Court has discussed the rational rela-
tion and fifth amendment analyses together (hereinafter "tradi-
tional analysis"), this article will review first these lines of analysis.
Tot v. United States,12 is the major pre-Holland Supreme
Court decision based on the rational relation analysis. In Tot the
defendant was convicted under a federal law that made it unlawful
for a felon to receive a firearm that had been transported or
shipped in interstate commerce.'2" The statute also provided that
mere possession of the weapon would be presumptive evidence
that the weapon had been shipped, transported, or received in vio-
lation of the law. The government relied on this presumption in its
case against Tot. 24
118. See state statutes cited in Nesson, supra note 115, at 1187-88. Interestingly, Pro-
fessor McCormick feels that the presumption of innocence, if based on probability, is "ab-
surd," since it is not more probable than not that the accused in most cases is innocent. C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 115, § 309.
119. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 115, § 309; see also Comment, Statutory Criminal Pre-
sumptions, Reconciling the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 157 (1970).
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
121. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). For a discussion of Winship, see infra notes 164-66 and ac-
companying text.
122. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
123. Federal Firearms Act, § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1939) (repealed 1968).
124. 319 U.S. at 464-65.
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The government argued that the presumption was valid be-
cause the defendant easily could have produced evidence showing
he did not receive the firearm in violation of the law, and because
Congress could have created a statute punishing mere possession
of the firearm.12 The Court rejected the government's claim, stat-
ing: "Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sus-
tained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from
proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection be-
tween the two in common experience." '26 The Court reversed the
conviction, holding that because no rational relation existed be-
tween possession of a firearm and its transport in interstate com-
merce, the presumption violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution.
27
The Supreme Court reviewed both legislatively and judicially
created presumptions under this standard in a number of post-
Holland cases during the 1960's and 1970's, including United
States v. Gainey,2 8 United States v. Romano,'29 United States v.
Leary, 30 Turner v. United States," " and Barnes v. United
States.3 2 In Gainey the jury was permitted to infer that the defen-
dant carried on the business of a distiller from the defendant's
presence around a still, and in Romano, the jury was permitted to
infer possession, custody, or control from the defendant's presence
around a still. "8 Using the Tot analysis in both cases, the Supreme
Court found a rational connection between presence and carrying
on the business of a distiller, but held that no rational connection
existed between presence and possession or custody of an illegal
still.1 3 4 In Gainey, therefore, the Court approved the statutory in-
ference and affirmed the conviction, and in Romano, the Court in-
validated the statutory inference and reversed the conviction.
In Leary and Turner, decided in 1969 and 1970 respectively,
the Court reviewed the validity of statutory presumptions that
permitted a jury to infer importation and knowledge of importa-
125. Id. at 467, 469-70.
126. Id. at 467-68 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 467-69, 472.
128. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
129. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
130. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
131. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
132. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
133. Romano, 382 U.S. at 137-38; Gainey, 380 U.S. at 69-70.
134. Romano, 382 U.S. at 141-42; Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-68.
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tion from the possession of various controlled substances. In Leary
the Court reviewed its earlier decisions and summarized them as
follows:
The upshot of Tot, Gainey and Romano is, we think, that a
criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational"
or "arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least
be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is
made to depend.'
The Court in Leary found no rational relation between the
possession of marijuana and knowledge that the substance had
been imported. Testimony at Leary's trial established the fact that
marijuana will grow anywhere in the United States, and that some
actually is grown here. 186 Relying on both this fact and the Tot
rationale, the Court stated that "to determine the constitutionality
of the 'knowledge' inference, one must have direct or circumstan-
tial data regarding the beliefs of marihuana users generally about
the source of the drug they consume. ' 187 Because such information
was not available, there was no rational relation between posses-
sion of marijuana and knowledge that it had been imported. The
presumption, therefore, was held invalid.
In Turner the Court concluded that a rational relation existed
between possession of heroin and knowledge of its importation, but
that no such rational relation existed with respect to cocaine.'"
Following a lengthy discussion, the Court stated that the "over-
whelming evidence" is that virtually all heroin consumed in the
United States is illegally imported.139 Given this fact, there was lit-
tle doubt that Turner knew that the heroin he possessed was im-
ported. 40 A jury could therefore infer that a defendant who pos-
sessed heroin knew that it was smuggled into this country.
Conversely, there was no evidence that large amounts of cocaine
are either imported or smuggled into this country. The Court cited
a government report and noted that "much more cocaine is law-
fully produced in this country than is smuggled into this coun-
try.' ' 4 1 The Court concluded that because the Court itself could
135. 395 U.S. at 36.
136. Id. at 39-43.
137. Id. at 37-38.
138. 396 U.S. at 408-16, 418-19.
139. Id. at 415-16.
140. Id. at 416.
141. Id. at 418.
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not be sure that the cocaine Turner possessed was imported, a jury
could not infer that Turner must have known that it was im-
ported.142 The Court thus affirmed Turner's heroin conviction but
reversed his cocaine conviction.
14 8
In 1973, in Barnes v. United States,14 4 the Court reviewed for
the first time a judicially created presumption. There, the jury was
permitted to infer from the defendant's unexplained possession of
recently stolen mail that the defendant knew that the mail was
stolen.145 The Court noted that at issue in Barnes was a "tradi-
tional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law," but that
even "[c]ommon-law inferences, like their statutory counterparts,
must satisfy due process standards in light of present-day experi-
ence."146 In Barnes the government's evidence established that the
defendant possessed treasury checks payable to individuals he did
not know, and that he had no plausible explanation for this posses-
sion. ' 7 Based on these facts, the Court held that the inference was
constitutionally valid."4 8
In both Turner and Barnes, the defendants argued that the
presumptions at issue placed impermissible pressures upon them
to testify in violation of the fifth amendment self-incrimination
clause. The Supreme Court quickly dismissed this contention in
both cases, '149 relying on Yee Hem v. United States.150 In Yee Hem
the defendant argued that a presumption of importation from pos-
session of opium violated the fifth amendment." 1 In an analysis
later used in Turner and Barnes, the Court rejected this argument
and affirmed the conviction, stating:
If the accused happens to be the only repository of the facts
necessary to negate the presumption arising from his possession,
that is a misfortune which the statute under review does not cre-
ate but which is inherent in the case. The same situation might
present itself if there were no statutory presumption and a
prima facie case of concealment with knowledge of unlawful im-
portation were made by the evidence. The necessity of an expla-
142. Id. at 419.
143. Id. at 424.
144. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
145. Id. at 838.
146. Id. at 843, 844-45.
147. Id. at 845.
148. Id. at 845-46.
149. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 846-47; Turner, 396 U.S. at 403-04.
150. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
151. Id. at 179-81.
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nation by the accused would be quite as compelling in that case
as in this; but the constraint upon him to give testimony would
arise there, as it arises here, simply from the force of circum-
stances and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the
Constitution.5
The Court in Turner and Barnes relied on the rational rela-
tion test and rejected the fifth amendment claims in affirming the
defendants' convictions. The Court also discussed but failed to de-
cide whether the burden shifting effect of a presumption in a crim-
inal case requires the government to prove the predicate fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
The Court finally resolved this issue in County Court v. Al-
len, " the most recent traditional analysis case. There, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the district court's order
granting the defendants' writ of habeas corpus, and held that a
New York statute54 was unconstitutional on its face because it
permitted the jury to infer from the presence of a firearm in a mo-
tor vehicle that the weapon was illegally possessed by all occupants
of the vehicle. 5 ' The evidence established that two handguns were
found in an automobile occupied by three adult males and a six-
teen year-old female. All four were convicted under the statute.'"
In Allen the Court created a distinction between a mandatory
presumption, which "tells the trier that he or they must find the
elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact,' 7 and a permissive
inference, "which allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to
infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic
one.""' The Court held that mandatory presumptions must be es-
tablished by facts sufficient to support the inference of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. For permissive inferences, however, the
Court held that the evidence need only establish that it is more
probable than not that the presumed fact will follow from the
predicate.5 9 The Court also stated that permissive inferences must
not be tested on their face, but only as applied to the facts of a
152. Id. at 185.
153. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
154. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967).
155. Allen v. County Court, 568 F.2d 998, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1977).
156. 442 U.S. at 144.
157. 442 U.S. at 157 (emphasis in original).
158. Id.




Because the New York statute was permissive in nature, the
Court ruled that the Second Circuit had incorrectly found it un-
constitutional on its face. 16' As applied to the facts of the case, the
statutory inference of possession satisfied the more probable than
not test"' because the passengers in the car were not hitchhikers,
and the guns in question were large and in plain view, although
partially concealed by a pocketbook. 63
Traditional analysis of presumptions thus requires that both
judicially and legislatively created inferences be carefully scruti-
nized under the due process clause of the Constitution. The Court
has held, inter alia, that the validity of an infererence must be ex-
amined in light of the facts presented in the case, that mandatory
inferences must meet a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, and
that permissive inferences must satisfy a "more probable than not"
test before they may be upheld constitutionally.
In rejecting fifth amendment claims and in creating a distinc-
tion between mandatory and permissive inferences, traditional pre-
sumption analysis briefly explores, but fails to focus upon, the bur-
den of proof in a criminal case. Another group of Supreme Court
cases, however, has carefully examined the effect of burden shifting
devices, such as the likely source inference, in light of the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Since an inference in a
criminal case increases the weight of the government's evidence
against the defendant, it affects the government's burden of proof
and alters the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the concept of burden of proof
began in 1970 in In re Winship.'" In Winship a New York stat-
ute 65 permitted an adjudication of delinquency based on a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was essential for any criminal
conviction, including that of a juvenile, and stated: "Lest there re-
main any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
160. 442 U.S. at 165-67.
161. Id. at 160-63.
162. Id. at 163-67.
163. Id.
164. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
165. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1967).
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with which he is charged." 1 "'
The Court first applied the Winship rationale to invalidate a
burden shifting device, a statutory affirmative defense, in Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur.1 67  In Mullaney the defendant was convicted of
murder under a Maine statute.168 Pursuant to the statute, the
court instructed the jury that if the defendant could prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he killed in the heat of passion,
the charges would be reduced from murder to manslaughter. 1'9
The defendant claimed that the law impermissibly shifted to him
the burden of proof in violation of due process. The Supreme
Court agreed and reversed the conviction. 17 0 The Court held that
lack of provocation was an essential element of the offense of
homicide, which under Winship the state must prove, and that the
state could not shift the burden of proving this element to the
defendant. 11
The Supreme Court established in Mullaney that an eviden-
tiary device which reallocates the burden of proof to the defendant
and relieves the state of proving an essential element of the offense
violates due process. Recently, the Supreme Court examined the
burden shifting effect of a presumption, the evidentiary device
used in connection with the proof of a likely source in tax evasion
cases.
In Sandstrom v. Montana,172 the Court reviewed a murder
conviction in which the intent of the defendant to commit the
crime was the only disputed element. The trial court had "in-
struct[ed] the jury that '[t]he law presumes that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.' "173 On appeal the
state contended that the instruction created a permissive inference
that was valid under Tot and Allen.1 7" The Court rejected this con-
tention, stating: "It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily
have viewed such an instruction as mandatory."175
The state also argued that even if mandatory, the presumption
166. 397 U.S. at 364.
167. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
168. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2551, 2651 (1964).
169. 421 U.S. at 685.
170. Id. at 703-04.
171. Id. But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1976) (placing burden on defen-
dant to prove that he acted under extreme emotional distress would not violate due
process).
172. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
173. Id. at 513.
174. Id. at 514.
175. Id. at 515.
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was valid because it did not conclusively establish intent, but
rather could be rebutted. 17 6 The Court also rejected this argument,
stating that the instruction could be viewed either "as an irrebut-
table direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the
facts," or "as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defen-
dant's voluntary actions . . . , unless the defendant proved the
contrary by some quantum of proof."' 177 The Court found that the
former interpretation would violate the defendant's constitutional
rights as set forth in In re Winship, because the jury could reason-
ably have concluded that the trial court had instructed it to con-
clude from "proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and
of facts insufficient to establish the second (the voluntariness and
'ordinary consequences' of defendant's action), 17 8 that intent ex-
isted. This, the Court stated, permitted the state to avoid its con-
stitutional duty to prove every element of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
179
The Supreme Court concluded that the state's rebuttable pre-
sumption argument violated the principles of Mullaney.180 The
Court reasoned that because the jury could have interpreted the
instruction as requiring affirmative proof of lack of intent, the
state again had been relieved of the requirement of proving intent
beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of due process.181
The Supreme Court thus has reviewed presumptions under a
rational relation test, the fifth amendment, and a burden of proof
analysis. The Court's recent attempts to clarify the use of infer-
ences and presumptions in Allen and Sandstrom have created con-
fusion in the courts and among the commentators.18' Some com-
mentators have suggested that no evidentiary device is now
constitutionally permissible, while others have suggested the unifi-
cation of the diverse threads of Supreme Court analysis into a
three-prong test, focusing on whether the device relates to or af-
fects a constitutionally "essential element" of the offense.'"
176. Id.
177. Id. at 517 (emphasis in original).
178. Id. at 523.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 524.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 950 (1980); Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1979).
183. See Allen, Structuring Jury Decision-Making in Criminal Cases: A Unified Con-
stitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HAv. L. Rlv. 321 (1980); Jeffries & Ste-
phan, supra note 117; Nesson, Rationality, Presumptions and Judicial Comment: A Re-
sponse to Professor Allen, 94 HA~v. L. REv. 1574 (1981); Underwood, supra note 117; see
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It is beyond the scope of this article, however, to discuss the
reconciliations proposed by the commentators in connection with
the likely source inference. Even under present Supreme Court
analysis, the likely source inference as presently formulated is
invalid.
B. Weaknesses in the Likely Source Inference
The 'likely source inference is highly unusual in its purpose
and scope in comparison to the evidentiary devices used in nontax
criminal cases. It is a judicially created inference of recent origin.
Inferences and presumptions, by permitting the jury to infer the
existence of the presumed fact from proof of the predicate, have
served to reduce the prosecution's burden of proof in criminal
cases. The likely source inference, however, should work in the op-
posite manner. The inference was judicially sanctioned by the Su-
preme Court in Holland as part of a package of evidentiary safe-
guards designed to protect the taxpayer. Although the inference
permits a jury to infer the presumed fact (taxable income) from
the predicate fact (a likely source for the claimed net worth in-
crease), prior to Holland, no judicial requirement of likely source
proof existed.
184
The likely source inference was designed to increase, not re-
duce, the government's burden of proof. Since the inference man-
dates the presentation of more, rather than less, evidence by the
government, it may properly be labeled a "reverse inference" and
is an anomaly in the criminal law.
The likely source reverse inference is invalid under both tradi-
tional due process analysis and self-incrimination analysis, and
also under the more recent burden of proof analysis. The fifth
amendment infirmity of the reverse inference first will be reviewed.
The Supreme Court has noted that the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination clause
"reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;...
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by in-
humane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dic-
also Allen, More on Constitutional Process of Proof Problems in Criminal Cases, 94 HAv.
L. REv. 1795 (1981).
184. Before Holland, it was Justice Department "policy" to present such likely source
proof. See Hill, supra note 2, at 118-19.
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tates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the govern-
ment . . ., in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load,' . . .; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter
to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.',86
The Supreme Court examined the self-incrimination clause in
a nonpresumption case, Griffin v. California.86 The provision of
the California Constitution 8 7 at issue permitted the court and the
prosecutor to comment at trial on the failure of an accused to tes-
tify. The prosecutor and the judge had done so in Griffin and the
petitioner was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court noted that
the state claimed that "the inference of guilt for failure to testify
as to facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any
event natural and irresistible.'' s The Court held, however, that
this inference was improper and stated, "What the jury may infer,
given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when
the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another."'8 Because the use of the inference
"cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly," the
inference violated the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment and the Court reversed the conviction.
1 90
In Holland the Supreme Court noted that "bare figures have a
way of acquiring an existence of their own, independent of the evi-
dence which gave rise to them."' 91 Moreover, the Court acknowl-
edged that once the government establishes a prima facie case, the
taxpayer "remains quiet at his peril.""'9 These statements by the
Court are an explicit recognition that the type of circumstantial
proof presented in a net worth case places serious and unyielding
pressure on the taxpayer to testify. To protect the taxpayer's con-
stitutional rights, including his right not to testify, the Court en-
acted evidentiary safeguards, including the likely source reverse
185. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299-300 (1981) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting 8 J. WIGMoiz, EVIDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev..ed.
1961))). In Carter the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case, upon re-
quest, is constitutionally entitled to a jury instruction that his silence may not be used
against him. This question was expressly reserved in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
186. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
187. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
188. 380 U.S. at 614.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 614-15.
191. 348 U.S. at 128.
192. Id. at 138-39.
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inference.
Cases that permit minimal likely source evidence to reach the
jury destroy the safeguard and, in reality, require the taxpayer ei-
ther to explain the "bare" net worth increase or be convicted.
What the courts in Ford v. United States,' United States v.
Frank,194 and United States v. Hamilton"5 really held is that
likely source proof, plus the taxpayer's failure to refute or explain
it, is sufficient to permit a jury to infer that the claimed net worth
increase was derived from currently taxable income. The pressure
upon the defendant to testify in these cases arises not from the
strength of the evidence, but rather from the likely source infer-
ence, bolstered by the defendant's silence. The defendant's silence
thus functions as additional evidence against him, and the failure
to require sufficient likely source proof places the taxpayer in what
Justice Black termed a "presumptive squeeze" in violation of the
fifth amendment self-incrimination clause."96 As one commentator
has stated:
If one accepts the proposition that the aggregate likelihood
presupposed by the permissive inference is not in itself enough
to sustain a verdict beyond reasonable doubt, then any attempt
to draw additional strength for the permissive inference from
the defendant's lack of explanation means necessarily that the
defendant's silence is functioning as an added piece of "evi-
dence," "solemnized" by the statute and the jury instruction. 1'
In Turner and Barnes, the Supreme Court stated that the
"traditional" inferences that were before the Court did not violate
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment."' In Turner,
however, the inference of importation was used solely to establish
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense, and in Barnes,
the government's own evidence established the falsity of the defen-
dant's explanation for possession. 99 In neither case was the defen-
193. 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 38 (1957); see supra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
194. 245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1957); see supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text.
195. 620 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1980); see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
196. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 87 (Black, J., dissenting); see supra text ac-
companying note 133.
197. Nesson, supra note 115, at 1211.
198. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 846; Turner, 396 U.S. at 417-18.
199. See supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Newman, 468
F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 905 (1973). In Newman the defendant con-
tended that he could not testify because his claimed cash hoard arose from thefts in pre-
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dant's silence affirmatively incorporated into the government's case
in chief. Moreover, in neither case was the Court concerned with a
method of proof under which, even with evidentiary safeguards,
the taxpayer remains silent at his peril, or with an inference
designed to increase, not decrease the government's burden of
proof. Thus, neither Turner nor Barnes sanctions the use of likely
source proof, which uses the taxpayer's silence to prove a substan-
tive element of the offense of tax evasion. Under Griffin, the use of
likely source proof under present standards violates the fifth
amendment.
Finally, as another commentator noted of the likely source in-
ference over fifteen years ago:
Surely if legislation attempted to establish a mere official accu-
sation of crime as sufficient to require the defendant to prove
himself innocent or take his chances with the jury, the courts
would strike it down, and on Fifth Amendment grounds. Yet the
difference between net worth proof and mere accusation is one
of degree only, and not a very large one.'
The likely source inference also violates the due process
clause. The Supreme Court constructed the likely source eviden-
tiary safeguard in Holland based on a practical recognition that
once a likely source is established, the taxpayer will either explain
the net worth increase to the satisfaction of the jury or will be con-
victed. Although jury instructions concerning the use of the likely
source inference usually are phrased in permissive terms, the infer-
ence should be considered a species of mandatory presumption, for
a jury always will find that the claimed net worth increase was
derived from taxable income if the government presents likely
source proof.
Thus, the jury may treat the proof of a likely source as creat-
ing an irrebuttable presumption that the increase in net worth was
derived from taxable income. Alternatively, the jury may treat the
likely source proof as creating a presumption of taxable income un-
less and until the taxpayer presents evidence negating the govern-
ment's likely source. Because the government's burden of proof is
prosecution years. The Court held that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
was not violated by requiring the defendant to decide whether to present a defense based on
prior criminal activity. The defendant interposed a defense based on his prior criminal ac-
tivity, but retreated behind the fifth amendment veil when asked to supply details that
would prove the validity of his testimony. In Newman the government presented sufficient
evidence of a likely source and negated nontaxable sources.
200. Duke, supra note 1, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
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reduced under either alternative, the use of the likely source pre-
sumption violates the due process clause under the Winship and
Mullaney analysis of the Supreme Court in Sandstromn.
2 0 1
If the likely source inference is considered as a mandatory pre-
sumption, the jury may view likely source proof as irrebuttable.
Once the government presents likely source proof, the jury will
find that the increase in net worth was derived from taxable in-
come. Under this interpretation, the likely source presumption re-
lieves the government of its burden of proving a deficiency in a tax
evasion prosecution, an essential element of the offense, and vio-
lates the due process clause under the Winship and Mullaney
analysis of the Supreme Court in Sandstrom.
Alternatively, the jury may view the proof of a likely source as
a direction to find taxable income from likely source proof unless
the defendant presents some evidence to the contrary. I believe
that it is this interpretation that the Supreme Court explicitly rec-
ognized in Holland when it stated that a defendant remained si-
lent in such cases at his peril.2 02 In United States v. Ford, 20 for
example, in the absence of explanation at trial, the jury found that
the source of the unreported income was the "opportunities" for
graft described by the government. Indeed, in all net worth cases,
unless the income is satisfactorily explained by the defendant, the
jury will infer the existence of taxable income from likely source
proof. Again, the government has used the inference to establish a
tax deficiency, an essential element of the tax evasion offense. The
burden shifting effect of the likely source presumption, although
phrased in permissive terms, also violates due process under the
Mullaney analysis in Sandstrom. Whether viewed as a device that
forces the taxpayer to testify or as a burden reallocation device,
the likely source rule cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Finally, it is possible that the likely source rule may be consid-
ered merely a permissive inference because the standard jury in-
struction is phrased in permissive terms. Under Tot and its prog-
eny, " this inference would be constitutionally valid if it is more
probable than not that the presumed fact of taxable income fol-
201. For a discussion of the Sandstrom case, see supra notes 172-83 and accompanying
text.
202. Indeed, the Holland Court recognized that the government "must still prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." 348 U.S. at 138.
203. 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 38 (1957); see supra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 122-43 and accompanying text.
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lows from proof of the predicate fact, the likely source. Even under
this analysis, current likely source proof still violates due process.
Currently, the government may either negate nontaxable
sources of income or prove a likely source for the claimed net
worth increase. Proof of an increase in net worth with no addi-
tional evidence that negates nontaxable sources should not satisfy
the more probable than not test. Any taxpayer may have received
loans, gifts, or inheritances during the years in issue. Proof that a
taxpayer operated a grocery store, as in United States v. Horn
Ming Dong,'0 ' or a bakery, as in United States v. Costanzo,'"
without proof that no loans or gifts existed, cannot alone satisfy
due process.
Although in Holland the likely source proof was so strong that
it carried with it its own nontaxable source negation, this is the
exception and not the rule. Logically and constitutionally, without
such nontaxable source negation, no jury should be allowed to
draw any inference that the net worth increase was derived from
currently taxable income. Probably in recognition of this concept,
the government in most, if not all, net worth cases attempts to ne-
gate nontaxable sources as part of its case in chief.
Nevertheless, even with nontaxable source negation, the
amount of evidence that the government currently introduces still
fails to satisfy due process. The mere "opportunities" for graft es-
tablished by the government in United States v. Ford,0 7 for exam-
ple, do not make it more probable than not that graft was the
source for the claimed net worth increase. The fact that the tax-
payer is a gambler, as in United States v. Costello,0 8 does not
make it more probable than not that gambling activities were the
source of a claimed net worth increase in excess of $100,000. The
fact that an individual operates a hotel, as in Whitfield v. United
States,'0 9 does not make it more probable than not that the hotel
is the source of the net worth increase.
Each of these cases could withstand constitutional scrutiny,
however, if there was proof that the source could account for all
or at least a substantial portion of the claimed net worth increase.
205. 436 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1971); see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
206. 581 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979); see supra notes 85-
88 and accompanying text.
207. 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 38 (1957); see supra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
208. 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955), a/I'd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); see supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text.
209. 383 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1967); see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Ford, if the government had shown specific in-
stances of graft, or if in Costello the government had produced tes-
timony of individuals who had gambled with and lost to the defen-
dant, the government could have established graft and gambling as
the respective likely sources. Similarly, if in Whitfield, the govern-
ment had presented comparative statistics showing that the hotel
reported significantly less income than other hotels in the commu-
nity, this evidence could have sufficed to prove a likely source for
the claimed net worth increase.
Although the government is not required to prove either the
specific source of the increase in the taxpayer's net worth or the
specific amount of taxes due, unless the likely source proof can ac-
count for all or a substantial portion of the claimed net worth in-
crease, the likely source inference, even if considered permissive, is
not constitutionally valid.
This author believes that the self-incrimination and due pro-
cess weaknesses in the likely source inference were the unstated
constitutional underpinnings for the reversals of the convictions in
United States v. Bethea 2 0 and United States v. Grasso211 Indeed,
each court required proof of a likely source sufficient to account for
the entire net worth increase. The continued use of the inference
in net worth prosecutions requires several similar cautionary mea-
sures by the courts.
IV. A FAITHFUL RETURN TO Holland
To satisfy both the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause
and the due process clause in net worth criminal tax prosecutions,
the government must be required in every case to negate nontax-
able sources of income. Once nontaxable sources of income are ne-
gated, the government may, at its option, introduce proof as to a
likely source. The courts must, however, carefully examine likely
source evidence. The following are four suggested standards by
which the court should evaluate likely source proof.
First, illegal likely source proof must be scrutinized under rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In most cases, the preju-
dicial nature of evidence of an illegal likely source clearly will out-
weigh its probative value. The government should, in such cases,
offer to stipulate that a likely source of unstated origin exists in
210. 537 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1976); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
211. 629 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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the case.2 2 The court should require a stipulation in the absence of
a government offer.
Second, a court should not admit likely source proof into evi-
dence unless the government can establish that the likely source
can account for all or a substantial portion of the claimed net
worth increase. This likely source proof may be based on compara-
tive statistics, as in Brodella v. United States, 13 Jelaza v. United
States," and Holland v. United States,18 strong circumstantial
evidence as in United States v. Rifkin,"' admissions as in United
States v. Tunnell, 2 7 or specific items of omission as in United
States v. Nunan 2 8 and United States v. Sclafani."'1 If the govern-
ment is able both to negate nontaxable sources and to establish a
likely source that accounts for all or a substantial portion of the
claimed net worth increase, then the government may constitution-
ally use the likely source doctrine to demonstrate that the increase
in net worth was derived from currently taxable income.
Third, the satisfaction of constitutional objections cannot end
judicial scrutiny of likely source evidence. Both the Supreme Court
and commentators have noted that a constitutional "tension" ex-
ists when courts apply a "more probable than not," rational rela-
tion test in a criminal proceeding in which proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt is required."10 Although the Supreme Court has not
resolved this tension satisfactorily under its various modes of anal-
ysis, the Court noted this tension in United States v. Gainey.2
Holding that the inference at issue was valid, the Court specifically
noted that the use of the inference did not infringe on the power of
the trial judge to determine whether sufficient facts had been
presented to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
noted that "[o]ur Constitution places in the hands of the trial
judge the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the jury
trial, including the right to have a case withheld from the jury
212. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); supra note 74.
213. 184 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950); see supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
214. 179 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1950); see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
215. 348 U.S. 121 (1954); see supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
216. 451 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1971); see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
217. 481 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); see supra notes 94-
96 and accompanying text.
218. 236 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 912 (1957); see supra text ac-
companying note 90.
219. 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); see supra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 117, at 349-50.
221. 380 U.S. 63 (1965); see supra notes 128 & 133 and accompanying text.
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when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a
conviction.""
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is entitled
"Motion for Judgment of Acquittal," and provides in part:
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall
order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses
charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction of such offense or offenses.25 8
A court must grant this motion unless the relevant evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to
support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
4
As previously noted,"5 to obtain a conviction under section
7201 of the Internal Revenue Code," the government must estab-
lish that the taxpayer knowingly and willfully attempted to evade
a substantial portion of the tax due and owing. To prove this defi-
ciency, the government's evidence must establish beyond a reason-
able doubt that there is not only a bare net worth increase, but
that there is also a likely source of the increase. Regardless of
whether the fifth amendment and due process objections are satis-
fied, judges must carefully scrutinize likely source evidence and
should direct verdicts against the government when appropriate
under the imperative of rule 29(a). It is the individual district
court trial judge who, in the last analysis, must stand between the
taxpayer and the government in a net worth case.
Finally, to protect the taxpayer whenever the government
presents proof of a likely source, the courts must, as Holland re-
quires, carefully instruct the jury as to the use of permissive infer-
ences both for and against the taxpayer."7
Several commentators have suggested that judicial comment
on the predicate facts introduced at trial and the conclusions that
222. 380 U.S. at 68.
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
224. For cases applying rule 29, see United States v. Varkonyi, 611 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); see also United States v. Skalicky, 615 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980) (judgment of acquittal granted for one count of three count
indictment).
225. See supra text accompanying note 4.
226. I.R.C. § 7201 (1976).
227. In United States v. Hall, 650 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit recently
reversed as plain error a lower court's failure to instruct on the inferences that arise in the
net worth method of proof.
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may be drawn from those facts provides more rational guidance to
the jury than the present summary by "abstraction" of a formal
jury instruction.2 28 This suggestion may well minimize the adverse
jury impact of a traditional presumption. In the unique context of
the likely source inference, however, which safeguard was estab-
lished to increase rather than reduce the government's burden of
proof, a judicial instruction remains essential.
A respected manual on jury instructions contains the following
instruction concerning the likely source inference:
If the evidence in the case shows beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant's net worth, computed in the manner just
stated has increased during the taxable year, then the jury may
draw the inference and find that the defendant had receipts of
either money or property during that year; and if the evidence
in the case also establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had one or more possible sources of taxable income
and that the receipts did not come from nontaxable income,
then the jury may draw the further inference and find that such
receipts constituted taxable income to the defendant." '
This instruction should be modified to encompass the "ab-
straction" of the inference and its permissive use in the context of
a net worth case. The instruction also must include admonitions to
the jury that they must determine whether the inference is justi-
fied in the particular case and that they must be convinced based
upon all the evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt. I recommend that the jury instruction be modified as
follows:
If the evidence in the case shows beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant's net worth, computed in the manner just
stated has increased during the taxable year, then the jury may
infer that the defendant has receipts of either money or prop-
erty during that year.
The receipts of money or property during the year is not
sufficient, however, to establish that such receipts came from
currently taxable income of the defendant. To establish that
such receipts came from currently taxable income, the govern-
ment is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had one or more sources of taxable income sufficient
to account for all or a substantial portion of the claimed increase
in net worth and to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
228. See Allen, supra note 183; Nesson, supra note 115, at 1222-23.
229. 2 E. DEVITr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 10, § 35.08.
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such receipts did not come from any nontaxable source. Non-
taxable sources include loans, gifts, inheritances, tax free inter-
est, and any other monies not currently taxable to the
defendant.
If you find from all the evidence in the case that the govern-
ment has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt either
one or more likely sources of taxable income sufficient to ac-
count for all or a substantial portion of the claimed net worth
increase or to negate the existence of nontaxable sources of in-
come, then you must acquit the defendant of all charges alleged
in the indictment. Moreover, even if you find beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant had one or more sources of taxable
income which account for all or a substantial portion of the
claimed increase in net worth, and that no nontaxable sources of
income existed, then you are permitted but need not infer that
such receipts by the defendant constituted taxable income for
the years in question. You must decide whether, in the context
of this case, such a conclusion is justified or warranted.
However, you are never required to draw either inference
and it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether
the facts, and the circumstances as shown by the evidence in
this case, warrant a finding that any inference should or should
not be drawn.
The negation of nontaxable sources, the requirement that the
proof of the likely source account for all or a substantial portion of
the net worth increase, careful analysis of the sufficiency of likely
source proof, and the new jury instruction presented above, should
ensure that the safeguard erected in Holland will, in fact, protect
the taxpayer rather than aid the government in a net worth case.
V. CONCLUSION
The government has employed the net worth method for over
fifty years. Recently, however, commentators and several circuit
courts have criticized both the likely source inference used in the
net worth method and the proof deemed sufficient to establish it.
To use the likely source inference in a constitutional manner, the
government must negate all nontaxable sources of income, and es-
tablish that the likely source is sufficient to account for all or a
substantial portion of the claimed net worth increase. A revised
jury instruction explaining the use of the likely source inference
also should be implemented.
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